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To pay for all the goods and services that a government ever buys, someone of 
some generation must pay at some time. If one generation pays less, another 
must pay  more. If  the government does not pay  for what it purchases with 
current taxes, it must raise them later-either  to retire the ensuing debt or to 
pay interest forever. Sooner or later, someone pays. 
This idea underlies the intertemporal government budget constraint, which 
states that the present value of prospective government purchases must be fi- 
nanced from the sum of three sources: the current net wealth of  government, 
the present value of the prospective net taxes of current generations (people 
now alive), and the present value of the prospective net taxes of future genera- 
tions (people not yet born).’ Thus the constraint reveals the way in which gov- 
ernment purchases involve a fiscal burden that someone must bear. 
For the prospective purchases implied by a given fiscal policy, generational 
accounting estimates how much of that total burden will fall on current versus 
future generations2 The analysis begins by  calculating the present value of 
prospective purchases for a given policy. The first source of financing (the gov- 
ernment’s current net wealth) is given. The second source (the present value of 
current generations’ net taxes) is obtained by estimating the per capita net taxes 
that each living generation will pay during its remaining lifetime, actuarially 
discounting the payments back  to the present,  and  summing over the dis- 
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1. Net taxes are taxes minus transfers. 
2. The technique of generational accounting was developed in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotli- 
koff (1991). See also Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1994). 
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counted values to obtain  a generational account for each generation.’ Those 
respective generational accounts are then added over everyone currently alive 
to find their combined contribution to prospective  purchases. Having calcu- 
lated the present value of prospective purchases and the first two sources of fi- 
nancing, the third source (the present value of unborn generations’ net taxes) can 
be computed as a residual. This residual expresses the fiscal burden that must 
be placed  on unborn  generations for the government  to remain  solvent for- 
ever. 
Finally, generational accounting compares all living generations on a life- 
time basis by estimating the effective rate at which each pays net taxes over its 
entire life-its  lifetime net tax rate. The method estimates past and prospective 
net taxes and labor income that each living generation earns over its life. The 
lifetime net tax rate is then stated as a percentage, namely, the present value, 
at birth, of a generation’s lifetime net taxes as a share of the present value, at 
birth, of its lifetime labor income. 
As an illustrative device, generational accounting further supposes that fu- 
ture generations share the residual burden equally (with an adjustment for eco- 
nomic growth). This implies that males and females born in each future year 
will face the same lifetime net tax rate. Thus the method compares all gener- 
ations on the same basis-the  effective rate at which they pay net taxes over 
their entire lives. 
Generational accounts help us judge whether fiscal policy is generationally 
balanced, that is, whether future generations will pay, on average, the same life- 
time net tax rate as current newborns (people born in the base year). A gener- 
ationally balanced policy is sustainable, meaning that it can be followed forever 
without changing its scheduled effective rates for taxes, transfers, and spend- 
ing. Conversely, a policy is imbalanced  (or unsustainable) if it implies that 
future generations must pay a different net tax rate than current newborns. 
An imbalance implies that to pay for prospective purchases, the scheduled 
rates of effective net taxes must change-if  not for current generations, then 
for future ones. If an imbalance implies that the future rate will be higher than 
the current rate, the rate must eventually rise. If  the imbalance is large, then 
the rate for some living or future generations will have to increase substantially 
and may harm their incentives to work, save, and invest. Hence, the finding of 
a large generational  imbalance points to the potential for weaker future eco- 
nomic performance. Conversely, if an imbalance implies that the future rate 
will be lower than the current one, someone must pay less to keep the govern- 
ment’s net wealth from growing so big that government owns all of the nation’s 
assets. Generational accounting can estimate the sizes of policy changes that 
would restore sustainability and generational balance. 
3.  An actuarial calculation allows for the fact that the current number of people in a generation 
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Section 2 1.1 reports generational accounts and the associated lifetime net 
tax rates for the United States. The results suggest that U.S.  fiscal policy is gen- 
erationally imbalanced. If  living generations pay net taxes as scheduled, fu- 
ture generations will have to pay a lifetime net tax rate far exceeding that of 
current newborns-49.2  versus 28.6 percent, an arithmetic difference of 20.6 
percentage points. 
Ordinarily, generational accounting does not estimate by  age who benefits 
from prospective purchases, only who pays for them with their net taxes. In 
this study, however, we also calculate an alternative set of accounts that assign 
to each living generation the benefit from its share of government spending on 
education. The recalculated accounts show a similar arithmetic difference in 
lifetime net tax rates. 
These results depend on a “reference” scenario for fiscal policy, the econ- 
omy, and the population. The reference policy used here cuts the deficit, split- 
ting the reduction evenly between Medicare and discretionary spending and 
balancing the budget in the years from 2002 through 2007. After that, however, 
it allows the deficit to widen, reflecting an aging population, slowing labor 
force growth, and rising per capita medical costs. Through 2070, the reference 
scenario depends on three  factors: the federal tax  and  spending schedule, 
the “no-feedback” economic projection of  the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), and the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) intermediate popu- 
lation projection (SSA 1997; CBO 1997b; 1997c, chap. 1). Beyond 2070, the 
reference scenario extends those fiscal, economic, and demographic projec- 
tions by the methods described below. 
The reference scenario does not include the recent budget reconciliation 
package (the Balanced Budget Act of  1997 and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
1997) because long-term projections under that package are not yet available. 
Other things equal, the results under the reference scenario should roughly 
correspond to those under the reconciliation package because both policies cut 
base spending on health care and other (non-social security) programs in about 
the same proportions. However, the most recent budget projections yield more 
than just midterm budget balance; they show a small surplus in 2002, which 
rises to about 0.7 percent of GDP in 2007 (CBO 1997a).  Therefore, the current 
fiscal stance is likely to produce a smaller generational imbalance than the one 
we report based on the reference policy. Even so, in contrast to the accounts 
reported earlier, the reference scenario implies a sharp decline in the degree of 
generational imbalan~e.~ 
Section 21.2 details the reasons for that decline, which occurred largely be- 
cause per capita costs for medical programs have recently grown more slowly 
than expected. Section 21.3 reports the amounts by  which generational ac- 
counts change when we alter the assumptions for population growth, govern- 
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ment spending, and economic growth or discount rates. Generational accounts 
move into or near balance under some of these assumptions but remain imbal- 
anced under most. 
Section 2 1.4 considers hypothetical policy actions that achieve generational 
balance by changing the reference policy's schedule for purchases or for the 
net taxes that living generations will pay. The required size of  such a change 
depends on whether it cuts prospective purchases or raises prospective net 
taxes for current generations. For instance, under the reference assumptions, 
balance could now be restored by  proportional cuts of  15.4 percent in  pur- 
chases or 18.5 percent in transfers, or by an increase of 8.9 percent in taxes. 
(The  changes  differ  because  the  programs  involve  different  initial  dollar 
amounts, and the effects of the changes depend on both how fast the programs 
expand and which generations are most affected.) Although we examine these 
policies only as examples of the magnitude of  the imbalance, it is clear that 
the longer the status quo persists, the more difficult it will be to restore genera- 
tional balance. Section 21.5 concludes the paper. 
21.1  The Generational Stance of U.S. Fiscal Policy 
2 1.1.1  Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint 
The intertemporal government budget constraint is expressed as 
(1)  PVG,  =  NWG, - PVL, +  PVF,, 
where PVG, is the present value of government purchases, NWG, is the current 
value of government financial net wealth, PVL, is the total present value of net 
taxes that living generations will pay over the rest of their lives, and PVF, is 
the residual fiscal burden that future generations must bear.5 
To calculate those values for a base case, we assume the following: (1) The 
real discount rate is 6 percent. (2) Labor productivity growth through 2070 is 
given by the reference scenario; beyond 2070, it is assumed to be 1.2 percent 
per year (its average annual growth rate for most of the reference scenario). 
(3) Aggregate taxes, transfers, and purchases through 2070 are given by the 
reference projection; beyond 2070, they are assumed to grow at a rate consis- 
tent with per capita growth at the same rate as labor productivity. (4) The popu- 
lation through 2070 is the SSA's  intermediate projection; from 2070 through 
5.  The constraint includes all debt, taxes, transfers, and purchases at every level of government. 
Unlike the National Income and Product Accounts, generational accounting treats spending on 
medical, disability, and retirement benefits for veterans and  government workers as purchases 
(payment for past services), rather than as transfers. For an explanation of how generational ac- 
counts treat taxes, transfers, and purchases, see Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (199  1). 
NWG, excludes the value of tangible government assets, and PVG, excludes the service flows 
of those assets. If NWG, included the assets, PVG, would have to include the service flows. Be- 
cause (in equilibrium) the assets and their service flows are equal in present value, they would 
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2200, we extend that projection by assuming that fertility, mortality, and net 
immigration rates remain at their 2070 values; beyond 2200, we assume that 
the size and the age composition of the population remain fixed. 
Under the reference policy and the assumptions mentioned earlier, PVG, 
equals $29.4 trillion, and NWG, (calculated as the algebraic sum of past real 
government surpluses) amounts to -$2.1  trillion. Loosely, NWG, is the neg- 
ative of net public debt, NDG,. PVL, equals $22.1 trillion, and PVF, is $9.4 
trillion.6 
It is PVF,, rather than NDG,, that more meaningfully reflects the fiscal bur- 
den that the reference policy imposes on future generations. NDG, includes 
only the explicit legal obligations of U.S. governments, not their implicit obli- 
gations. For example, the current debt ignores the unfunded liabilities of Medi- 
care, social security, and government retirement programs. Outlays for these 
programs will accelerate in the future as the baby boom generations retire and 
as the costs of health care programs mount. In contrast to the debt, PVF, in- 
cludes all prospective government liabilities, implicit as well as explicit. We 
calculate that PVF, is more than four times as large as NDG,: $9.4 trillion 
versus $2.1 trillion. 
21.1.2  Generational Accounts 
A generational account is the present value of the per capita net taxes that 
a generation will pay for the rest of its life under the assumed fiscal policy. 
(Generational accounting defines a generation by  sex and year of birth.) To 
obtain each generation’s prospective per capita values through 2070, genera- 
tional accounting first distributes among the generations the reference projec- 
tions for aggregate taxes and transfers. The distribution assumes that the cur- 
rent ratios of per capita taxes and transfers by age and sex remain fixed. For 
instance, in a given year, 50-year-old women always pay 38 percent as much 
in per capita payroll taxes as do 40-year-old men.7 Beyond 2070, generational 
accounting assumes that the per capita amount of each type of  tax or trans- 
fer by  age or sex grows at the same rate as labor productivity. The resulting 
streams of per capita net taxes are actuarially discounted to the base year in 
order to calculate the generational account for each living generation. (The 
base year in this case is 1995, the latest year for which we have the ratios of 
per capita taxes and transfers by age and sex.) 
As tables 21.1 and 21.2 show, generational accounts follow a life cycle pat- 
tern. Young generations at or near working age will pay a significant amount 
6. All dollar figures are reported in constant 1995 dollars. 
7. The ratios are estimated from official survey data. For details of the procedure, see Auerbach 
et al. (1991); for a description of the respective ratios of per capita net payments by age and sex, 
see CBO (1995.7-8). 
For social security and government retirement programs, the generational accounts shown here 
reflect the way in which productivity growth feeds gradually into benefits under current schedules. 
Thus the ratios of per capita benefits by age and sex for these programs need not remain fixed. See 
CBO (1997b). Table 21.1  Composition of Male Generational Accounts under Reference Assumptions (present value in thousands of 1995 dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Generation's  Net Tax  Capital 
Age in  1995  Payment  Labor Income  Income  Payroll  Other'  OASDI  Health  Other 
0  77.4  33.5  9.0  34.3  31.5  7.2  19.6  4.2 
5  95.7  41.6  11.2  42.8  36.6  8.8  22.5  5.2 
10  119.5  52.1  14.3  53.9  42.5  10.6  26.3  6.5 
15  149.1  65.1  18.1  67.8  48.6  12.1  30.4  8.1 
20  182.2  79.5  23.5  83.6  53.4  13.7  34.4  9.7 
25  196.2  86.0  27.9  90.6  53.5  16.4  35.4  10.1 
30  196.8  86.3  33.7  90.2  52.7  19.9  36.4  9.8 
35  189.0  82.9  40.7  86.0  51.4  24.6  38.2  9.2 
40  171.2  76.0  46.6  78.6  50.4  30.8  40.9  8.7 
45  139.2  65.1  50.2  67.4  47.7  38.8  44.3  8.1 
50  93.7  50.8  51.3  52.9  43.7  49.3  48.0  7.6 
55  37.5  34.6  49.7  36.3  38.7  62.8  52.0  7.0 
60  -25.5  18.6  46.3  19.5  32.9  80.1  56.5  6.3 
65  -77.7  7.4  41.2  7.5  27.5  91.8  63.8  5.7 
70  -89.2  3.2  33.0  3.3  22.2  85.0  60.9  5.1 
75  -87.9  1.6  22.4  I .7  16.9  71.7  54.5  4.2 
80  -77.2  0.9  11.2  1  .o  11.9  54.8  44.4  3.1 
85  -68.3  0.7  0.0  0.7  8.0  42.6  32.9  2.1 
90  -53.8  0.5  0.0  0.5  6.3  33.7  25.9  1.7 
Future generations  134.6 
Percentage difference  71.9 
~~ 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: Future generations are those born in 1996 and thereafter. The net tax payment represents a present value as of  1996. The percentage difference between the net 
tax payments of future generations and current newborns is calculated after adjustment for growth (see text). 
"Includes excise and other indirect taxes, property taxes, and other taxes. Table 21.2  Composition of Female Generational Accounts under Reference Assumptions (present value in thousands of  1995 dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Generation's  Net Tax  Capital 














































































































































































Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note:  Future generations are those born in 1996 and thereafter. The net tax payment represents a present value as of  1996. 
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of  taxes for several years before  they retire and collect social security and 
Medicare benefits. Hence, their generational accounts are positive and high. 
By  contrast, older generations  in  or near retirement  will pay  low taxes and 
receive high transfers for most of their remaining years. Thus their generational 
accounts are negative. 
The generational accounts for women of any age are lower (or more nega- 
tive) than those for men of the same age. On average, women pay lower taxes 
because they are less likely to work in the marketplace and earn less when they 
do. Moreover, they live longer and often receive payments as widows on their 
husbands’ accounts. Therefore, relative to their earnings, they receive more in 
transfers, especially for medical care and social security. 
Generational accounts compare on the same lifetime basis the net payments 
of current newborns (those born in 1995) and future generations (those born 
later). That is, the accounts show the present value of per capita net taxes that 
each group will pay over its entire life. How do their accounts compare? Under 
the reference policy, the generational account for a 1995 newborn is $77,400 
for a male and $5 1,900 for a female. As mentioned earlier, the residual burden 
on future generations is $9.4 trillion, but there is no way to know how they 
would share that burden. To get around this problem, generational accounting 
assumes that future generations split the burden equally on a growth-adjusted 
basis. As noted, this assumption amounts to specifying that males and females 
born in each future year will pay combined lifetime net taxes at a uniform rate.* 
Given this assumption, the reference policy implies that males born in 1996 
will pay an average of  $134,600 (in present value as of  1996), while females 
will pay an average of $90,200. These payments are larger than the correspond- 
ing payments of current newborns, indicating that the reference policy is out 
of generational balance. 
2 1.1.3  Lifetime Net Tax Rates 
So far, it has been legitimate to compare directly only the generational ac- 
counts of current newborns and future generations. These accounts give each 
group’s net payment over its entire life. Other generations, however, are at vary- 
ing stages of their life cycles. Thus their accounts are not directly comparable 
because their net payments are stated only over their remaining lives. For in- 
stance, the generational account of a 40-year-old man is higher than that of a 
8. The calculation assumes that labor productivity (and hence, eventually, per capita income) 
grows each year at rate g. In that case, an equal growth-adjusted share of the burden means that the 
per capita net payment of each future generation is 1 +  g times that of its immediate predecessor. If 
males born in 1996 pay  Y dollars each, then males born in 1997 pay  Y( 1 + g) dollars each, males 
born in  1998 pay  Y(l  + g)’  dollars each, and so forth. (Generational accounting gives those per 
capita net payments in present value as of  year of the generation’s  birth.) Similarly, if females born 
in 1996 pay X  dollars each, then females born in 1997 pay X(l + g) dollars each, and so on. This 
procedure amounts to assuming that all future males pay  lifetime net taxes at a uniform rate- 
their lifetime net taxes grow generation by  generation at the same rate as their lifetime incomes. 
Future females also pay lifetime net taxes at a uniform rate, but it is lower than the rate for males. 497  Generational Accounts for the United States: An Update 
Table 21.3  Lifetime Net Tax Rates for Living and Future Generations under 
Reference Assumptions 
Components of Net Tax Rate 
Generation’s 
















































Source: Authors’ calculations 
Note: Future generations are those born in 1996 and thereafter. Numbers may not add up because 
of rounding. 
50-year-old man because the 40-year-old has 10 more years of taxes to pay and 
is 10 years farther from receiving social security and Medicare benefits. But 
the accounts cannot say whether the 40-year-old paid net taxes in the past at 
the same effective rate as the 50-year-old when he was 40. Nor do the accounts 
state how a 60-year-old woman’s current negative account compares with her 
past net taxes. 
To compare everyone on the same basis, generational accounting calculates 
the effective rate at which each generation pays net taxes over its entire life- 
its lifetime net tax rate. The method first estimates each generation’s past net 
taxes (in addition to its prospective net taxes) to find its per capita lifetime net 
taxes. Those per capita net taxes are then discounted to the year in which the 
generation was born in order to find its generational account at birth. Similarly, 
the procedure estimates each generation’s per capita lifetime labor income and 
finds its present value at birth. The generational account at birth is then divided 
by  the present value at birth of per capita lifetime labor income to yield the 
generation’s lifetime net tax rate. A lifetime net tax rate compares all genera- 
tions on the same basis-the  effective share of labor income that its members 
will pay in net taxes over their entire lives. 
As table 2 1.3 shows, the lifetime net tax rate for successive generations has 
both risen and fallen over the century. It started at 23.9 percent for people born 
in 1900, climbed to 33.4 percent for those born in 1950, then fell to 28.6 per- 
cent for those born  in 1995.9  The rise in the rate for successive generations 
9. The rates are ratios of population-weighted net taxes to population-weighted labor incomes. 498  Jagadeesh Gokhale, Benjamin R. Page, and John R. Sturrock 
through  1950 coincided with a similar increase in the share of output devoted 
to government purchases. The decline in the rate for successive generations 
since 1950 stems mostly from three factors: longer life expectancies, a decline 
in the effective rate of excise taxes, and-most  important-the  rapid growth 
in per capita health care and social security transfers that began in the 1960s.Io 
The results shown in table 21.3 indicate that the reference policy is unsus- 
tainable.  Either prospective  purchases  must fall or the effective  schedule at 
which people pay net taxes must rise-if  not for current generations, then for 
future ones. If current generations pay net taxes as scheduled by the reference 
policy, current newborns will pay lifetime net taxes of 28.6 percent, and future 
generations will pay 49.2 percent.” 
We can use these lifetime net tax rates to quantify the notion of generational 
imbalance. The degree of such imbalance is given as a percentage, namely, the 
arithmetic difference between the lifetime net tax rates of future generations 
and current newborns as a fraction of the lifetime net tax rate of current new- 
borns. Thus the degree of imbalance under the reference scenario is 72 percent 
(the difference between 49.2 and 28.6 as a percentage of  28.6). A degree of 
zero indicates generational balance while a negative degree indicates an imbal- 
ance in favor of the future. 
21.1.4  Benefits of Government Spending on Education by Age and Sex 
How would this outcome differ if the accounts assigned, by age, the benefits 
that living generations receive from government purchases? It is impossible to 
assign the benefits from many purchases, such as those for defense or adminis- 
tration, because they generate public services that apply equally to everyone.’* 
Arguably, however, we can estimate by  age the per capita benefits from one 
category of  purchases-educational  spending  (now  about one-fifth  of  total 
government purchases). Below, we recalculate the generational  accounts by 
treating all prospective government spending for education as a transfer rather 
than a purchase, then distributing that spending by age.I3 
The recalculation substantially lowers the lifetime net taxes of those under 
age 25 (see tables 21.4 and 21.5), since they receive most of the benefits from 
10. Excise taxes affect a generational account at birth more than do other taxes. Generational 
accounting prorates excise taxes among all family members, including children. Therefore, a de- 
cline in the excise tax lowers the estimated taxes that a child pays early in life. An earlier payment 
has a higher present value at birth than does the same payment at a later time. Hence, a cut in the 
excise tax lowers lifetime net tax rates by more than does a cut in another tax that reduces current 
revenue by the same amount. 
I I. These figures do not predict what will happen, only what would happen if the reference 
policy applied to current generations for the rest of their lives. 
12. Beyond 2070 (the end of the reference projection), generational accounting prorates each 
year’s per capita cost of such purchases to everyone alive in that year. However, the method is used 
only to estimate total prospective purchases, not to try to assign the benefits of those purchases 
by age. 
13. Data used in the calculation are from the Department of Education (1997). Table 21.4  Composition of Male Generational  Accounts under Reference Assumptions: Benefits of Educational Expenditure Distributed by Age 
and Sex (present value in thousands of 1995 dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Generation's  Net Tax  Labor  Capital 




































































































































































































Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: Future generations are those born in 1996 and thereafter. The net tax payment represents a present value as of 1996. The percentage difference between the net 
tax payments of future generations and current newborns is calculated after adjustment for growth (see text). 
"Includes excise and other indirect taxes, property taxes, and other taxes. Table 21.5  Composition of Female Generational  Accounts under Reference Assumptions: Benefits of Educational Expenditure Distributed by 
Age and Sex (present value in thousands of 1995 dollars) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Generation's  Net Tax  Labor  Capital 

































































































































































































Source: Authors' calculations. 
Note: Future generations are those born in 1996 and thereafter. The net tax payment represents a present value as of 1996. The percentage difference between the net 
tax payments of  future generations and current newborns is calculated after adjustment for growth (see text). 
"Includes excise and other indirect taxes, property taxes, and other taxes. 501  Generational Accounts for the United States: An Update 
such spending. The recalculated generational account for males born in 1995 
is only $25,700, and for females, only $100. Thus educational spending can- 
cels much of the net taxes that the rest of the reference policy imposes on the 
youngest generations. 
At  the  same time, the recalculation also lowers projected purchases  (by 
classifying educational outlays as transfers) and thereby reduces the residual 
burden on future generations. Thus, at 19.8 percentage points, the arithmetic 
difference in the recalculated lifetime net tax rates of future generations and 
current newborns is nearly as large as when educational outlays are counted 
as purchases. 
21.2  Recent Improvement in the Generational 
Stance of U.S. Fiscal Policy 
In the past two years, the generational stance of U.S. fiscal policy has im- 
proved markedly from that reported in the accounts using 1993 as the base year 
(GA1993).14 Given the economic outlook and policy schedule of  two years 
ago, GA1993 estimated that future generations would pay  a lifetime net tax 
rate of 84.4 percent. That rate falls to 49.2 percent under the reference scenario 
for the base year 1995 (GA1995). 
What explains this improvement? Most of  it stems from lower projected 
federal spending for medical care, which is now  about  10 percent less than 
what was expected two or three years ago. As a result, projected transfer spend- 
ing for health care is growing from a lower base and remains a smaller share 
of output (see fig. 21.1). The output shares of other projected taxes, transfers, 
and government purchases are also below levels seen two years ago. The reason 
for lower purchases growth is that projections for state and local government 
purchases are below GA1993 levels. 
We  examine the effects of  moving from GA1993 to GA1995 by  cumula- 
tively updating their underlying assumptions. The change from base year 1993 
to 1995 means that the accounts treat people born in 1994 and 1995 as current 
rather than as future generations. In GA1995, these two generations no longer 
assume a share of the accumulating residual burden that falls on future genera- 
tions. Thus time and compound interest alone raise the lifetime net tax rate on 
future generations to 87.4 percent (see table 21.6). The updated projections 
for population, however, reduce that rate to 85.3 percent. As noted, the newer 
projections for transfers (especially for health care) decrease the rate much 
farther-more  than 40 percentage points. The smaller transfers projected for 
14. See Auerbach et al. (1995). The base calculation in 1993 used the Office of Management 
and Budget’s economic and budget projections through 2030. Those projections were extended by 
assuming that per capita taxes, transfers, and purchases by  age and sex grew at the same rate as 
labor productivity. 
These calculations, and those that follow, treat government outlays for education as purchases. 502  Jagadeesh Gokhale, Benjamin R. Page, and John R. Sturrock 
OASDI 
12.00 , 
............  .........  c1 .-t,-c  .......  ___..’ 
;  4.00 
0.00 - 
1995  2015  2035  2055 
Ymmr 
Medicaid 
12.00 ,  I 
-.“.I 
1995  2015  2035  2055 
Y#lI 
hbor  Income Tax 
;  4.00 
0.00 




;  4.00 
0.00 - 
1995  2015  2035  2055 
YNI 
Prowrtv and Other Taxes  .. 
12.00  ,  I 




1995  2015  2035  2055 
Y*Y 
Other Tranrfan 
12.00 ,  I 
1995  2015  2035  2055 
Yamr 
Capltal Income Tax 
l:.:FJ  ......  .... 
0.00 
1995  2015  2035  2055 
Y*.I 
Excite and Other Indirect Taxes 
8  0.00 
3  4.00 
0.00 




1995  2015  2035  2055 
Y... 
Fig. 21.1  Comparison of projected budget aggregates: GA1993 and GA1995 
Source: Office of Management and Budget; Congressional Budget Office; authors’ calculations. 
Note: Dashed line is GA1993; solid line is GA1995. “Excise and other indirect taxes” excludes 
property taxes. 
GA1995 entail higher net taxes on living generations and thus a lower residual 
burden on future ones. The more recent estimates of current government net 
wealth and projected purchases by  state and local governments lighten that 
burden still more. By contrast, the lower revenue projections of  GA1995 re- 
duce the lifetime net tax rate on current newborns and raise that on future gen- 
erations. 503  Generational Accounts for the United States: An Update 
Table 21.6  Generational Accounts, 1993 versus 1995: Cumulative Impact of 
Updating Demographic and Fiscal Projections 
Lifetime Net Tax  Rates 
Future  Percentage 
Newborns  Generations  Difference 
1993 Accounts 
Freeze 1993 policy for two years 
Update demographic projections 
Fiscal projections 
Transfers 
1. Social security 




2. State and local 
Government wealth 
Taxes 
1. Income (labor and capital) 
2. Payroll 
3. Excise and other indirect 
4. Property and other 















































Source: Authors' calculations. 
21.3  Sensitivity to Alternative Assumptions 
21.3.1  Alternative Projections for Government Purchases and Health Care 
The reported calculations depend on many uncertain or arguable economic 
and budgetary assumptions. For instance, the reference scenario assumes that 
real federal discretionary spending falls through 2007 at an average rate of  1.3 
percent per year; after that, it grows at the same rate as output. By contrast, the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 limits discretionary spending only through 2002, 
although subsequent legislation may extend such limits even more.I5 
In the near term, both the budget act and the reference policy would intensify 
the post-Korean  War period's  secular decline in discretionary spending as a 
share of output. In the long run, however, it may be difficult to keep such a 
tight rein on discretionary spending (mostly purchases). For instance, federal 
nondefense purchases since the 1950s have varied little as a share of output. 
Moreover, the current replacement schedule for aging defense systems may 
strain prospective budgets. 
15. The act itself extended the limits on discretionary spending set by the Omnibus Budget and 
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Similar  uncertainty  besets  projections  of  federal  mandatory  spending 
(mostly transfers), especially for health care. Through 2007, the reference sce- 
nario assumes that real per capita Medicare outlays by age outpace labor pro- 
ductivity by an average of 3.4 percentage points per year. That difference tapers 
to zero by  2020, after which Medicare  spending is assumed to grow at the 
same rate as labor productivity. On average through 2020, per capita Medicare 
spending by age grows 2.4 percentage points per year faster than labor produc- 
tivity.Ih 
Projections  for health  care outlays  are  notoriously  uncertain.  For  many 
years, analysts underpredicted per capita spending for these rapidly expanding 
programs. In the past several years, however, such outlays have increased much 
more slowly than expected. No one is entirely sure of the reasons behind this 
slowdown, and it is possible that rapid growth may resume. On the other hand, 
growth may continue at its slower pace or slacken even more, and budgetary 
pressures may require limits on the expansion of medical programs. 
How much do the accounts change if we look at alternative budgetary as- 
sumptions in order to allow for uncertainty or ambiguity? To find out, we ex- 
amine the effects of  two optimistic policies that specify lower spending for 
purchases and health care.17  The first holds real federal purchases constant after 
2000; the second slows the growth rate of per capita Medicare outlays by age. 
Under the latter policy, per capita medical spending through 2003 grows at an 
average rate that is 2 percentage points per year slower than under the reference 
policy. After 2003, per capita outlays expand at the same rate as labor produc- 
tivity. 
These policies depart significantly from current conditions and from the ref- 
erence policy. For example, federal purchases now represent 6.0 percent  of 
output. In 2070, that share is 4.2 percent under the reference policy, but only 
1.5 percent if real federal purchases stay constant after 2000. Total spending 
for Medicare is now equal to 2.7 percent of output. In 2070, it reaches 7.1 
percent under the reference policy, but only 4.3 percent if that spending grows 
more slowly. 
Given the other reference assumptions, these alternative policies reduce the 
generational imbalance but do not eliminate it. If real federal purchases remain 
constant after 2000,  the  lifetime net taxes of  living generations remain un- 
changed. However, the policy lowers projected  spending for purchases. That 
decrease leaves a smaller residual burden on future generations, reducing their 
lifetime net tax rate from 49.2 to 44.6 percent (see table 21.7). Unlike constant 
purchases, slow Medicare growth boosts the per capita net taxes of every living 
generation  (because it  lowers  their projected  transfers). Like constant  pur- 
chases, however, slow Medicare growth lessens the burden that current genera- 
16. The Health Care Financing Administration (1997) makes similar assumptions. 
17. Projected federal purchases under this assumption serve as a proxy for federal discretionary 
outlays. Purchases now make up about 90 percent of federal discretionary spending, which in turn 
accounts for around 37 percent of noninterest federal outlays. 505  Generational Accounts for the United States: An Update 
Table 21.7  Lifetime Net Tax Rates under Alternative Health Care and Federal 
Purchases Assumptions 
Slower  Slower  Slower 
Generation’s  Purchases  Health Care  Health Care and 
























































Future generations  49.2  44.6  38.1  33.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
”Federal purchases are held constant in real terms after the year 2000 
bPer  capita spending by age for health care grows 2 percentage points slower than under reference 
policy through 2003 and grows at the same rate as labor productivity thereafter. 
tions leave for future generations, and their lifetime net tax rate falls to 38.1 
percent. A policy of both constant real federal purchases and slow Medicare 
growth yields lifetime net tax rates of 33.5 percent for future generations and 
30.9 percent for current newborns. Therefore, a small generational imbalance 
remains despite optimistic assumptions for federal purchases and Medicare 
outlays. 
The response of lifetime net tax rates to slower Medicare growth may seem 
paradoxical. Slow growth raises the lifetime net tax rate for the oldest gener- 
ation the least, although that generation receives the lower transfers now. By 
contrast, slow growth increases that rate for the youngest generation the most, 
although these individuals collect the lower benefits later. This pattern occurs 
in part because people over age 65 will receive the smaller benefits for fewer 
years until death, a fact that reduces its cumulative lifetime impact. 
More fundamentally, the pattern occurs because slower growth makes a 
greater difference over a long time horizon. For instance, if per capita benefits 
rise 1 percentage point per year less, benefits at age 65 will be 1 percent lower 
for this year’s 64-year-old, 2 percent lower for this year’s 63-year-old, and so 
forth. Moreover, the decline in benefits at age 65 is discounted not to the base 
year but to the generation’s year of birth. Thus slow Medicare growth cuts the 
present value of the newborn’s benefit at age 65 by proportionately more than 
that of the one-year-old. Slower growth thus raises the lifetime net taxes (re- 
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the one-year-old, boosts the net taxes of a one-year-old by more than those of 
a two-year-old, and so on. 
2 1.3.2  Alternative Discount and Productivity Growth Rates 
The accounts also depend on uncertain assumptions about the rates of dis- 
count and productivity growth. As noted, the reference case uses a real dis- 
count rate of 6 percent (I = 0.06) and assumes that labor productivity eventu- 
ally increases 1.2 percent per year (g = 0.012). 
A 6 percent discount rate is roughly equal to the historical real rate of return 
on equity, but there are arguments for using a lower or higher rate. For ex- 
ample, it may be reasonable to use a discount rate closer to the real rate of re- 
turn on long-term government debt (2 or 3 percent), or to the real pretax rate 
of return on private capital (10 or 12 percent). That range reflects ambiguity 
about how to deal with such issues as risk, opportunity cost, and the equity- 
premium puzzle (see CBO 1995,4  1-43). 
In the same vein, the trend of labor productivity has varied significantly in 
the past, growing at an average annual rate of  1.3 percent from 1902 to 1929, 
1.2 percent from 1929 to 1948,2.8 percent from 1948 to 1966, and 0.9 percent 
from 1966 to 1996.'*  Moreover, productivity growth swung wildly during the 
1929-48  period in response to the Depression, World War 11,  and demobiliza- 
tion. To  examine how sensitive the results are to these assumptions, we next 
calculate generational accounts using  alternative discount and productivity 
growth rates. The alternative assumptions are 3 and 9 percent for the discount 
rate and 0.7 and 1.7 percent for the productivity growth rate. 
Given the reference policy, generational accounts remain imbalanced under 
all combinations of these growth rates, with the degree of imbalance ranging 
from 53 to 334 percent (see table 21.8). Given the alternative spending poli- 
cies, some combinations of discount and productivity growth rates tip the gen- 
erational scales in favor of the future. Most do not, however, and the degree of 
imbalance ranges from -4  to 155 percent (see table 21.9). Lifetime net tax 
rates on future generations fall below those on current newborns only at a low 
discount rate and a moderate or high growth rate. 
The degree of imbalance responds more to the differences considered for 
the discount rate than to those for the productivity growth rate. A higher dis- 
count rate typically makes the residual burden accumulate faster and thereby 
raises the degree of imba1an~e.l~  On the other hand, higher productivity growth 
tends to boost income and output, and they in turn feed into higher values for 
18. For consistent comparison, labor productivity is defined in this example as GDP per worker. 
The periods seem to define growth epochs, with the first three spanning nonsuccessive peaks in 
the annual business cycle. There was no peak in  1966, but economists generally agree that the 
trend in labor productivity growth changed about then. Neither was 1996 a peak year, but it is the 
most recent full year for which we have data and comes after a long (six-year) expansion. 
19. This statement is true as long as the sum of the current value of the net debt of government, 
NWG,, plus the present value of prospective government purchases, PVG,, exceeds the present 
value of prospective net taxes of living generations, PVL,. The condition is easily satisfied for any 
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Table 21.8  Percentage Difference in Lifetime Net Tax Rates of Future 
Generations and Current Newborns under Alternative Discount 
and Growth Rate Assumptions 
Growth Rate 
Discount 
Rate  0.007  0.012  0.017 
0.03  84  53  83 
0.06  160  72  127 
0.09  334  130  253 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 21.9  Percentage Difference in Lifetime Net Tax Rates of Future 
Generations and Current Newborns under Alternative Discount 
and Growth Rate Assumptions with Slower Health Care Growth 
and Constant Real Federal Purchases 
Growth Rate 
Discount 




24  -4  10 
85  8  53 
126  45  155 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
purchases and the net  taxes of  living generations (see CBO  1997b). That 
phased-in response dilutes the impact of  higher productivity growth on the 
lifetime net tax rates of all generations.*O 
2 1.3.3  Alternative Demographic Projections 
Uncertainty about population growth also afflicts generational accounts (or 
any other long-run projection).  As noted, the accounts use the SSA’s intermedi- 
ate projection for a base case (and extend it as described earlier). However, the 
SSA also projects high- and low-growth paths to try to describe a reasonable 
range of uncertainty about its estimates for the probable actuarial balance of 
20. Seemingly paradoxical reversals sometimes occur. For example, suppose that the discount 
and productivity growth rates shown in table 21.8 move, respectively, from 3 to 6 percent and 
from 0.7 to 1.2 percent. The degree of imbalance then falls from 84 to 72 percent. However, it 
subsequently rises to 253 percent as the discount and productivity growth rates move higher, to 9 
percent and 1.7 percent, respectively. Such reversals occur both because the degree of  imbalance 
is a percentage ratio and because the discounting process can lead to the same kind of “reswitch- 
ing” issues that arise in capital theory. A higher discount rate reduces the absolute present value in 
any year a tax is paid or a wage transfer is received. A higher productivity growth rate raises those 
absolute present values. Therefore, a lifetime net tax rate may go up or down if both the discount 
and productivity growth rates are higher. Moreover, people generally pay taxes in youth and middle 
age and receive transfers in old age. Other things equal, a higher discount rate reduces the present 
value of both taxes and transfers, so that the present value of net taxes (taxes less transfers) may 
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Fig. 21.2  Population 1900-1990 and projections 2000-2200 
the social security trust fund. The three population projections represent low- 
cost (alternative I), mid-cost (alternative 11), and high-cost (alternative 111) out- 
comes. 
The differences in populations depend on differences in their fertility, mor- 
tality, and net immigration rates. Alternative I assumes the highest rates for all 
of those demographic factors, and alternative I11 assumes the lowest. Higher 
rates imply more workers paying taxes and fewer retirees receiving transfers; 
lower rates imply the opposite. The population of alternative I grows to about 
twice that of alternative 11, while the population of alternative I11 falls to about 
half the size (see fig. 21.2).*' 
All of  the alternatives show a rise in the old-age dependency ratio-the 
population aged 65 or older as a share of the population aged 20 to 64. As the 
baby boom generations retire, that ratio increases during the years from about 
2010 to 2035 (see fig. 21.3). The ratio for alternative I1 then levels off, with 
fertility and immigration rates largely offsetting its mortality rates to roughly 
stabilize the size and the age composition of the population. The ratio for alter- 
following cases: the initial discount or productivity growth rate is higher, the recipient receives a 
given transfer at a later age, or the recipient gets a larger transfer at a given age (as in the earlier 
case of slow Medicare growth, when the newborn's benefit at age 65 was cut by  proponionately 
more than that of the one-year-old). 
21. Another way  to compare these alternatives is to look at their populations in 2200 as ratios 
of the population in  1995. Under alternative I, the population increases by the year 2200 to more 
than 300 percent of its 1995 level; under alternative 11,  it rises to about  150 percent of its 1995 
level; and under alternative III, it declines to about 70 percent of its 1995 level. 509  Generational Accounts for the United States: An Update 
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Fig. 21.3  Old-age dependency ratios under alternative population projections 
native I falls, since higher mortality rates reduce the relative number of  old 
people, and higher fertility and immigration rates expand the relative number 
of working-age people. The opposite occurs under alternative 111. 
For living generations, higher mortality and immigration rates usually imply 
higher generational accounts for the old and lower ones for the young (see 
table 2 1. lo). For instance, the accounts of old generations are higher (less neg- 
ative) under alternative I than under alternative 11,  while the accounts of very 
young generations are lower. The higher mortality rates associated with alter- 
native I imply that fewer people of any age live to any given year in the future. 
People now old will receive less in transfers, and people now young will pay 
less in taxes (whose present value is greater than that of the later transfers that 
they would otherwise receive). 
The pattern is not strictly consistent because net immigration boosts the later 
size of some young generations. For instance, the generational account for 20- 
year-old males is highest under alternative I. That apparent anomaly reflects 
the prospective U.S. net taxes of the current foreign 20-year-old males who 
will immigrate later. That is, the population count in  the base year excludes 
their present numbers, but the generational account includes their prospective 
taxes and transfers. In effect, the accounts assign those prospective net taxes 
to the current population of  20-year-old US.  males. That assignment raises 
the (per capita) generational account; a higher immigration rate increases it 
still more. 
The accounts of living generations typically vary by  less than 2 percent in 510  Jagadeesh Gokhale, Benjamin R. Page, and John R. Sturrock 
Table 21.10  Generational Accounts under Alternative Demographic Assumptions 
(present value in thousands of 1995 dollars) 
Generation’s 
Age in  1995 
Net Tax Payments under Alternatives 
I  I1  111 






















Lifetime net tax ratesa  (%) 
Current newborns 
Future generations 
75.4  50.3 
94.1  62.1 
118.8  77.1 
149.3  95.1 
183.3  114.8 
195.8  121.7 
195.7  119.4 
187.7  112.5 
170.0  98.1 
138.3  72.2 
93.3  37.3 
37.6  -4.8 
-24.8  -51.0 
-76.3  -89.4 
-87.5  -98.8 
-86.1  -98.6 
-75.6  -88.1 
-66.9  -72.0 
-52.8  -54.8 
116.6  77.8 
52.1  52.1 
26.8 
40.9 
77.4  51.9 
95.7  63.4 
119.5  78.1 
149.1  95.7 
182.2  115.0 
196.2  122.6 
196.8  120.7 
189.0  113.8 
171.2  99.0 
139.2  72.8 
93.7  37.4 
37.5  -5.2 
-25.5  -52.0 
-77.7  -91.2 
-89.2  -101.0 
-89.9  -101.0 
-77.2  -90.2 
-68.3  -73.5 
-53.8  -55.8 
134.6  90.2 
71.9  71.9 
28.6 
49.2 
79.8  53.6 
97.7  65.0 
121.0  79.4 
149.8  96.7 
181.9  115.6 
196.5  123.6 
197.2  121.8 
189.2  114.8 
171.7  99.7 
139.8  73.2 
94.0  37.4 
37.3  -5.7 
-26.3  -53.0 
-79.0  -92.8 
-90.9  -103.1 
-89.7  -103.2 
-78.9  -92.2 
-69.6  -75.1 
-54.8  -56.8 
153.7  103.3 
89.5  89.5 
30.3 
57.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
“Lifetime  net tax rates are population-weighted averages across males and females. 
response  to population  differences. The percentage differences tend  to be 
greatest at the ages with the highest mortality rates-newborns  and seniors. 
The alternative populations assume greater difSerences in their mortality rates 
and thus imply greater proportional differences in their generational accounts. 
Fertility rates affect only the population of future generations, not the accounts 
of current generations. 
For future generations, fertility, mortality, and net immigration rates all play 
a role. The higher fertility rates of alternative I imply larger future generations 
to  share the residual burden, thereby reducing their lifetime net  tax  rates. 
Higher mortality rates play a smaller and partly offsetting role. Fewer young 
people live to pay taxes in middle age, fewer middle-aged people live to collect 
benefits in old age, and fewer old people live to collect them for as long a 511  Generational Accounts for the United States: An Update 
period. Given the age pattern of  net immigration, a higher immigration rate 
implies relatively more workers. 
The lifetime net tax rates of future generations respond more to alternative 
populations than do those of current newborns. Even if differences in mortality 
produce a relatively small change in the account of any one current generation, 
their combined effect produces a relatively large change in the residual burden 
on future generations. Under the various population assumptions, the lifetime 
net tax rate for future generations ranges from about 41 percent under alterna- 
tive I to about 58 percent under alternative 111.  The degree of  generational 
imbalance ranges from 52  percent under alternative I to 90 percent under alter- 
native 111.  Thus, even under optimistic assumptions about the population, the 
reference policy remains unsustainable. 
21.4  Policies for Eliminating Generational Imbalance 
2  1.4.1  Alternative Ways to Indicate the Extent of Generational Imbalance 
So far, we have assumed that living generations pay net taxes as scheduled 
for the rest of their lives. The spending side of the fiscal schedules examined 
here have followed the reference policy or an alternative policy (either constant 
real federal purchases or slow growth in Medicare outlays, or both). We  have 
further assumed that all future generations share the resulting residual burden 
proportionately by paying the same lifetime net tax rate. Given the other refer- 
ence assumptions, each policy we have considered has been generationally im- 
balanced (i.e., future generations must pay a higher lifetime net tax rate than 
current newborns) and is thus unsustainable. 
Some observers have criticized this way of analyzing the generational stance 
of  fiscal policy, arguing that if  a fiscal schedule is unsustainable, lawmakers 
will change it so that some or all living generations will pay higher net taxes, 
and future generations will pay less than they otherwise would have (see, e.g., 
Eisner 1994; Haveman 1994).22  To address this concern, we now calculate pol- 
icy changes that would equalize the lifetime net tax rates of current newborns 
and future generations. The policies we examine involve permanently raising 
particular taxes or cutting particular outlays by  a policy-specific percentage 
starting in 1998,2003, or 2016. The different policies result in different equal- 
ized lifetime net tax rates on current newborn and future generations and re- 
quire different dollar amounts of  tax increases or outlay cuts in the first year 
of their implementation. 
22. Another criticism stems from the Ricardian equivalence proposition, which states that cur- 
rent generations, perceiving that higher current deficits entail higher net taxes on future genera- 
tions, will respond by increasing their saving and bequests. However, formal tests fail to detect the 
altruistic behavior required for Ricardian equivalence to hold. See Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 
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21.4.2  Percentage Changes Needed in Various Programs to Reach Balance 
The first two rows of table 2 1.1  1 repeat the lifetime net tax rates on current 
newborns and future generations under the alternative assumptions. The re- 
maining rows list alternative tax, transfer, or purchase policies that may be used 
to restore generational balance, while the columns indicate the assumptions 
(reference, constant real purchases, slow health care growth, and so on) under- 
lying the calculations. Columns (1)-(4)  show the required percentage change, 
and columns (5)-(8)  indicate the equalized value of  the lifetime net tax rate 
under each row-specific policy and column-specific as~umption.~~ 
Given the other reference assumptions, balance can be achieved in 1998 by 
permanently raising the schedules for all income taxes on current generations 
by  20.4 percent (panel A, row  1, col. [  11). That equalizes lifetime tax rates at 
3 1.9 percent, raising the rate on current newborns from 28.6 percent and low- 
ering the rate on future newborns from 49.2 percent (panel A, row  1, col. [5]). 
If  real federal purchases remain constant after 2000, the required hike in in- 
come taxes is 15.8 percent, implying an equalized lifetime net tax rate of 31.1 
percent (panel A, row 1, cols. [2] and [6]). If Medicare spending grows slowly, 
the income tax hike is even smaller (7.1 percent), but the equalized lifetime 
net tax rate rises (32.1 percent). With constant real federal purchases and a 
deceleration in Medicare outlays, the required tax increase is smaller yet (2.6 
percent), and the equalized lifetime net tax rate is 3 1.3 percent. 
Similarly, if we fix the other reference assumptions and change the various 
fiscal programs, balance can be reached via several alternative policies, includ- 
ing a hike in taxes of  8.9 percent, a cut in social security transfers of  47.5 
percent, a cut in health care outlays of 36.8 percent, or a reduction in all pur- 
chases of  15.4 percent (col. [l]). These policies equalize the lifetime net tax 
rates of current newborns and future generations at values that differ by policy, 
namely, 32.3 percent for raising all taxes, 30.1 percent for cutting social secu- 
rity benefits, 31.3 percent for cutting all health care benefits, 31.0 percent for 
cutting all transfers, and 28.6 percent for cutting all purchases. (The reasons 
for these differences are explained below.) 
21.4.3  Variation in Percentage Changes and 
Equalized Lifetime Net Tax Rates 
Why do the percentage changes and the equalized lifetime net tax rates dif- 
fer across each row  and down each column of  table 21.11? Moving across 
each row, the respective percentage changes are lower because the underlying 
assumptions involve progressively smaller degrees of initial imbalance. Hence, 
restoring balance requires progressively smaller percentage changes in a row- 
specific policy. 
23. A table indicating the initial dollar amounts of revenue increases and transfer or purchase 
reductions for each of the policies considered in table 21.11 is available upon request from the au- 
thors. Table 21.11  Policies for Equalizing the Lifetime Net Tax Rates of Newborn and Future Generations 
Percentage Change  Equalized Lifetime Net Tax Rate 
Slower  Slower 
Health Care  Health Care 
Slower  Slower  and  Slower  Slower  and 
Purchases  Health Care  Purchases  Purchases  Health Care  Purchases 
Reference  Growth”  Growthb  Growth  Reference  Growth’  Growthb  Growth 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
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A. Policy Change in 1998 
Percentage tax increases 
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7.1  2.6 
8.7  3.1 
10.8  3.9 
13.9  5.0 
3.1  1.1 
16.5  5.9 
16.8  6.0 
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8.8  3.2 
10.8  3.9 
13.5  4.8 
17.7  6.4 




















31.5 Table 21.11  (continued) 
Percentage Change  Equalized Lifetime Net Tax Rate 
Slower  Slower 
Health Care  Health Care 
Slower  Slower  and  Slower  Slower  and 
Purchases  Health Care  Purchaqes  Purchases  Health Care  Purchases 
Reference  Growth’  Growthb  Growth  Growth”  Growthb  Growth  Reference 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 





















20.0  7.2 
20.2  7.3 









6.8  2.5 
17.4  6.5 
C.  Policy Change in 2016 
15.8  5.7 
19.2  6.9 
24.5  8.8 
35.5  12.8 
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33.0  11.9 
32.7  11.7 










12.3  4.8 











Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Nolet Calculations incorporate projections by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). “Newborn” refers to generations born in  1995; future generations are as of 1995. 
”Federal purchases are held constant in real terms after the year 2000. 
bPer  capita spending by age on health care grows 2 percentage points slower than under reference policy through 2003 then grows at the same rate as labor productivity growth 
‘Refers to federal, state, and local income taxes. 
dIncludes  excise and other indirect taxes. Drooertv taxes. and other taxes 515  Generational Accounts for the United States: An  Update 
Across each row, there is no general pattern for the level of  the equalized 
lifetime net tax rate, but there is a pattern for the change in the lifetime net tax 
rate of current newborns. For a change in a given tax or transfer, the change in 
that lifetime rate is smaller as we move across each row. For example, an in- 
crease in the income tax that restores balance raises the lifetime net tax rate of 
current newborns by  3.3 percentage points under the reference policy (3  1.9 
percent vs. 28.6 percent). But that lifetime rate rises by 2.5 percentage points 
when real purchases remain constant, by 1.2 percentage points when Medicare 
spending grows slowly, and by  0.4 percentage point when real purchases re- 
main constant and Medicare spending grows slowly. 
For  a cut in purchases, the net taxes of all living generations remain un- 
changed, so the lifetime net tax rate of current newborns stays at its initial 
value as we move across each row. However, cutting purchases lowers the re- 
sidual burden on future generations, and achieving balance requires that the 
cut be large enough to reduce the rate on future generations until it equals that 
on current newborns. 
For a column-specific initial policy, the variation in the outcome depends 
largely on which generations are most affected by the row-specific change in 
policy. On average, older individuals pay more in taxes on capital income and 
receive more in transfers from social security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Thus, 
a change in the schedule for such a tax or transfer will make every living gener- 
ation contribute more-the  old now, the young later. By contrast, a change in 
the schedule for a program that primarily affects young individuals effectively 
reduces the number of generations that make additional contributions. There- 
fore, between two programs of the same initial size, an equalizing policy that 
affects the old more than the young will require both a smaller percentage 
change and a smaller increase in the lifetime net tax rate on current newborns. 
The aging of the population and the rapid rise in medical costs greatly magni- 
fies these effects. 
21.4.4  Costs of Waiting 
Waiting for five years, until 2003, before undertaking such policies requires 
larger changes than acting sooner (compare columns [  11-[4]  in panel B with 
those in panel A). Under the reference scenario, the delay in trimming pur- 
chases again leaves the equalized lifetime net tax rate at the same level as that 
for current newborns. However, the required percentage cut is larger than when 
action is taken sooner (19.5 vs. 15.4 percent). Acting later to raise taxes or to 
cut transfers results in a higher equalized lifetime net tax rate than does acting 
sooner. The delay implies that some living generations escape the higher taxes 
or lower transfers, meaning that living and future generations must each bear 
higher lifetime net tax rates. 
Waiting until the year 2016-about  the time the largest baby boom genera- 
tions will retire-requires  even greater changes (see panel C). Again, except 
for purchase cuts, the lifetime net tax rates in panel C are higher than their 516  Jagadeesh Gokhale, Benjamin R. Page, and John R. Sturrock 
counterparts in panel B. Such a long delay in restoring balance will involve 
unrealistically high tax increases, benefit cuts, or purchase reductions. For ex- 
ample, it would involve defaulting on 95 percent of social security’s implicit 
obligations to living generations. 
21.5  Conclusion 
Reasonable economic and demographic assumptions imply that the genera- 
tional stance of U.S. fiscal policy remains seriously imbalanced. Although the 
degree of this imbalance has declined from two years ago, the reference sce- 
nario implies lifetime net tax rates of 49.2 percent for future generations and 
28.6 percent for current newborns. The schedule of such a policy cannot per- 
sist. At some point, projected government purchases must fall or scheduled net 
tax rates must rise-if  not for living generations, then for future ones. We have 
described the sizes of hypothetical policy changes that would restore genera- 
tional balance. They appear large, but failure to act  soon will require  even 
bigger changes in the future. 
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